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ABSTRACT 
 
 Textualism is the theory of legislative interpretation championed most famously by the 
late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.  Textualism adopts twin interpretive commitments:  
(1) the meaning of a legislative text should be discerned by application of long-established 
canons of construction, the most important of which is that the text means what its words 
convey; and (2) a legislative text means what it meant at the time it was enacted.  This paper 
examines the first principle, and in particular Scalia and treatise coauthor Bryan A. Garner’s 
belief that it mandates that judges forswear any consideration of legislative intent.  This paper 
assess the presupposition that linguistic meaning can be divorced from speaker intent. 
The paper explicates Scalia and Garner’s theory that linguistic meaning is purely 
conventional and critiques it in light of analyses of language philosophers to the effect that 
meaning is part conventional, part intentional.  It then demonstrates that a number of Scalia and 
Garner’s own canons of construction require attributions of legislative intent.  When they sense 
this tension, Scalia and Garner tend to claim that they are interpreting the legislation in view of 
its “textually manifest purpose,” but they fail to make any meaningful distinction between such 
purpose and an intent they are imputing to the enacting legislature.  The paper concludes that the 
intent-purpose distinction is a false one that makes for disjointed interpretations and obscures the 
real debate over legislative interpretation:  how wide to set the interpretive parameters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Textualism is the theory of legislative interpretation championed most famously by the 
late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.  In the view of Scalia and his treatise coauthor 
Bryan A. Garner,1 textualism is motivated by the belief that judicial neglect of the language of 
legislation undermines democracy, the rule of law, and our constitutional system of separation of 
powers.  The object of textualism is to secure an interpretive methodology that honors the 
primacy of legislation.2  Consistent with those motivations and purposes, textualism adopts dual 
interpretive commitments:  (1) the meaning of a legislative text should be discerned by 
application of long-established canons of construction and other interpretive principles, the most 
important of which is that the text means what its words convey3; and (2) a legislative text means 
what it meant at the time it was enacted.4  The second principle—commonly called 
                                                             
1 Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul, MN: 
Thomson/West, 2012).  I take Scalia and Garner’s treatise to be the most representative and exhaustive statement of 
textualism and for that reason use it almost exclusively as my foil in this paper.  Alternate variants of textualism may 
elude some or all of my criticisms. 
 
2 Ibid., xxvii-xxx.  The chief rival to textualism these days, and the whipping boy throughout the treatise, is 
purposivism.  According to Scalia and Garner, purposivism “facilitates departure from text in several ways.  Where 
purpose is king, text is not—so the purposivist goes around or behind the words of the controlling text to achieve 
what he believes to be the provision’s purpose.  Moreover, purpose is taken to mean the purpose of the author (the 
legislature or private drafter)—which means that all sorts of nontextual material such as legislative history . . . 
becomes [sic] relevant to revise the fairest objective meaning of the text.”  Ibid., 18. 
 
3 Ibid., 56. 
 
4 Ibid., 78. 
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“originalism”—is the better known of the two, especially in its application to constitutional 
interpretation.  This paper will examine the first principle. 
Scalia and Garner believe that principle mandates that interpreters of legislation forswear 
any consideration of the intent of the legislature.  We can identify in their treatise three 
philosophical objections to judicial reliance on legislative intent, though Scalia and Garner do 
not classify them in this way: 
The metaphysical objection:  Legislative intent does not exist unless everyone 
who voted in favor of the statute shared a subjective preference as to the 
interpretive question at issue, which is unlikely in the extreme. 
 
The epistemological objection:  Even if there were such a legislative intent on an 
interpretive question, we have no reliable way of discovering it. 
 
The political objection:  Even if legislative intent existed and were known to us, 
judges should nevertheless ignore it and give effect only to the objective meaning 
of the statutory language because that is what the law is. 
 
This paper will not answer any of these objections.  Instead it will address an underlying 
presupposition shared by all three, and indeed upon which any objection to legislative intent 
must depend:  that linguistic meaning can be divorced from speaker intent.  If we cannot arrive at 
linguistic meaning without imputing some intent to the speaker, then it is no good exhorting 
judges not to look to legislative intent, never mind your philosophical objections. 
 Part I will set up the problem, employing a hypothetical case of statutory interpretation 
that Scalia and Garner use to illustrate how textualism works.  Part II then explicates the theory 
of linguistic meaning that Scalia and Garner feel compelled to adopt and critiques it in light of 
more promising alternatives that incorporate both conventional meaning and speaker intent.  Part 
III returns to the original hypothetical case and demonstrates that more is under consideration 
than just the conventional meanings of the words of the statute, of which fact Scalia and Garner 
are partially aware.  Part IV turns to Scalia and Garner’s makeshift conventional meaning 
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auxiliary, statutory purpose, and queries whether it is not just legislative intent in disguise.  Part 
V contends that textualists are not obliged by their motivations and purposes to deny legislative 
intent wholesale and proposes an alternative methodology still consistent with those purposes, 
hypothetical intentionalism.  Finally, as Part VI elaborates, even should textualists reject that 
proposal, acknowledging the inescapable role played by intent will clear the stage for the real 
debate over legislative interpretation:  how wide to set the interpretive parameters. 
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I.   “NO PERSON MAY BRING A VEHICLE INTO THE PARK” 
 
 
 Scalia and Garner invite the reader to consider the fictitious statute “No person may bring 
a vehicle into the park.”  Which of the following would the statute exclude from the park? 
Airplanes 
Automobiles 
Bicycles 
Roller skates 
Toy automobiles5 
 
Scalia and Garner first identify “vehicle” as the word whose meaning is at issue and 
survey some reputable dictionaries in an attempt to discover that word’s “ordinary 
meaning.”  (One of the first canons of construction in the treatise is “Words are to be understood 
in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a technical 
sense.”6)  The first definition in some dictionaries is “a substance, esp. a liquid, serving as a 
means for the readier application or use of another substance mixed with or dissolved in it.”  The 
authors quickly rule out this meaning on the grounds that the context of the statute, “which 
includes its purpose of excluding things from the park,” indicates the statute is not talking about 
mixing media:  “There is no more reason to address intrusion into the park of mixing media than 
to address intrusion of elephants.”7 
                                                             
5 Scalia and Garner, 36.  The example was invented by H.L.A. Hart.  Scalia and Garner add several items to 
the list, but for our purposes we can stick to Hart’s original. 
 
6 Ibid., 69. 
 
7 Ibid., 37. 
5 
 
They next identify a few definitions they think are closer to the sense of the statute:  “a 
means of carrying or transporting something”; “a means of conveyance, usu. with wheels, for 
transporting people, goods, etc.”; “any means of carriage or transport”; “a receptacle in which 
something is placed in order to be moved.”  Still unsatisfied, Scalia and Garner continue their 
dictionary search until they hit on “a self-propelled conveyance that runs on tires; a motor 
vehicle.”  The earlier definitions would have been so broad as to include luggage with wheels, 
supermarket grocery carts, and baby carriages, all of which the authors assert do not come within 
the ordinary meaning of vehicle.  Even “self-propelled conveyance that runs on tires” is not quite 
correct, they say, because that would include in its scope remote-controlled miniature cars, 
“which does not seem right.”8 
Thus, Scalia and Garner are forced to create their own definition:  “The proper colloquial 
meaning in our view (not all of them are to be found in dictionaries) is simply a sizable wheeled 
conveyance (as opposed to one of any size that is motorized).”  The authors justify their 
introduction of the size condition and their removal of the motor condition by the observation 
that designation of roadways for “vehicular traffic” would permit horse-drawn carriages or 
rickshaws but would disallow remote-controlled toy cars, baby carriages, tricycles, and maybe 
bicycles.  Finally, they reason the ban on vehicles would not apply to airplanes because, as 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., explained in ruling airplane theft outside the scope of the 
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, “It is possible to use the word to signify a conveyance 
working on land, water, or air,” but “in everyday speech ‘vehicle’ calls up the picture of a thing 
moving on land.”9 
                                                             
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Ibid., 37-38. 
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One worry the reader might have about the foregoing analysis is that it does not seem 
exactly to minimize room for judicial discretion, which was one of the concerns motivating 
textualism in the first place.  Scalia and Garner write their own definition of a statutory term, 
after all.  But the more fundamental inconsistency that I want to draw to the reader’s attention is 
that Scalia and Garner appear to be considering the intentions of the enacting legislature.  We 
will return to this case later on, but it will be helpful before discussing it further to examine 
Scalia and Garner’s theory of linguistic meaning. 
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II.   MEANING WITHOUT A SPEAKER? 
 
 
If laws are to make sense at all on Scalia and Garner’s view, given their various 
objections to legislative intent, they seemingly must do so purely by operation of their words 
themselves.   An illuminating discussion of this theory of meaning comes in Scalia’s review of 
the book Law’s Quandary by Steven D. Smith.10  Scalia tries to demonstrate that meaning need 
not incorporate the speaker’s intent; moreover, he forecasts pernicious consequences if we let in 
speaker intent to our theory of meaning.  In this section I will assess in turn Scalia’s attempted 
exclusion of intent and his fears about its possible inclusion, deploying in response to his points 
some influential analyses by language philosophers.  (This same theory of meaning is assumed 
throughout Scalia and Garner’s treatise, although it is not defended as thoroughly as in Scalia’s 
earlier article.  I will note the brief corresponding discussion from the treatise.) 
 
a.   The Intention Presupposition 
 
 
Scalia takes issue initially with Smith’s assertion that “it is a ‘basic ontological 
proposition that persons, not objects [i.e., letters and words], have the property of being able to 
mean.’”  Thus, “‘[l]egal meaning depends on the (semantic) intentions of an author.’”11  Scalia 
                                                             
10 Antonin Scalia, “Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary,” Catholic University Law Review 55, 
no. 3 (2006): 687. 
 
11 Ibid., 691. 
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offers what he takes to be a counterexample.  Two people happen upon the words “LEAVE 
HERE OR DIE” written in the desert sand:  “It may well be that the words were the fortuitous 
effect of wind, but the message they convey is clear, and I think our subjects would not gamble 
on the fortuity.”12 
Pace Scalia, John Searle thinks it “essential to any specimen of linguistic communication 
that it involve a linguistic act.”13  It is not the word or sentence, but rather “it is the production of 
the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of linguistic 
communication.”  Searle invites the skeptic to reflect on the fact that when he interprets a mark 
on a page to be an instance of linguistic communication, i.e., a message, “one of the things that is 
involved in his so taking that [mark] is that he should regard it as having been produced by a 
being with certain intentions”:  “He cannot just regard it as a natural phenomenon, like a stone, a 
waterfall, or a tree.  In order to regard it as an instance of linguistic communication one must 
suppose that its production is what I am calling a speech act.”  Had archaeologists been certain 
that hieroglyphs had been produced by water erosion, there would never have been any question 
of deciphering them or even of calling them hieroglyphs.  To make sense of linguistic 
                                                             
12 Ibid., 691.  See also Scalia and Garner, 25: 
 
To say that words have no meaning, indeed no existence, apart from the intention of their author is 
a ludicrous extension of the thesis that a tree falling in a deserted forest makes no noise.  King 
Lear would still be King Lear if it were produced by the random typing of a thousand monkeys 
over a thousand years.  And a Bob Hope joke would still be funny if it were sculpted in sand by 
the action of the desert wind.  To be sure, authors may use figures of speech that cause 
straightforward statements to mean the opposite of what they say.  It is possible to write “That is a 
brilliant notion!” meaning to convey that the notion is quite absurd.  But that the statement 
represents sarcasm or irony or satire is apparent from its context (the device would be ineffective 
otherwise) . . . . 
 
13 John Searle, “What is a Speech Act?,” in Pragmatics, Discourse Analysis and SocioLinguistics, chap. 2, 
vol. 1 of Methods in Language and Social Interaction, ed. Ian Hutchby (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2008): 1. 
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communication, we must logically presuppose that the language in question was produced by an 
agent with certain intentions.14 
Even Scalia cannot quite bring himself to deny the logical presupposition.  Recall his 
explanation of the allegedly non-intentional meaning of “LEAVE HERE OR DIE”:  “It may well 
be that the words were the fortuitous effect of wind, but the message they convey is clear, and I 
think our subjects would not gamble on the fortuity.”  That last clause gives the game away to 
Searle.  In speculating about how those who find the sandy missive will respond, Scalia 
implicitly concedes that they will contemplate the source and (if the source is intelligent) the 
intent of the message.  Our desert trekkers will leave because they think someone was trying to 
warn them off, or at least because there is some possibility (a pretty good one) the words were 
not produced by “the fortuitous effect of wind,” and the stakes seem to be high.  As Mark 
Liberman puts it, “[O]f course, the genuine human response to Scalia’s LEAVE HERE OR DIE 
example would be to reason, at least briefly, about the author of the message and the intent 
behind it—a threat? a prank? an improbable accident? the slogan of a defunct weight-loss camp, 
missing its last letter?”15 
 
b.   Meaning as Intention plus Convention 
 
 
That the claim that meaning depends in part on the speaker’s intentions is an “extravagant 
and nonsensical one,” Scalia continues, is made plain by the case of Humpty Dumpty: 
                                                             
14 Ibid., 2. 
 
15 Mark Liberman, “Scalia on the Meaning of Meaning,” Language Log (blog), October 29, 2005 (11:58 
p.m.), http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/002603.html. 
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That is why Humpty Dumpty’s statement of the claim (“When I use a word it 
means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less”) has always been 
regarded—by all except Carroll’s game-playing Logicians—as hilarious 
nonsense.  Alice and I believe that words, like other conventional symbols, do 
convey meaning, an objective meaning, regardless of what their author “intends” 
them to mean . . . .16 
 
But as Keith Donnellan and Donald Davidson have explained, the Humpty Dumpty 
counterexample does not show that speaker intention plays no part in linguistic meaning.  It 
merely shows that “intentions are connected with expectations and that you cannot intend to 
accomplish something by a certain means unless you believe or expect that the means will, or at 
least could, lead to the desired outcome.”17  Mr. Dumpty cannot mean what he says he means 
when he uses “glory” to mean (as he informs Alice later) “a nice knockdown argument” because 
he knows that Alice cannot interpret him in that way.  So admitting the presupposition of speaker 
intent does not lead inexorably to the Humpty Dumpty theory of meaning.  Although we 
approach language with the presupposition of a speaker-agent with intentions, that does not 
afford speakers complete latitude to communicate those intentions in whatever way their whims 
dictate:  “Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also a matter of convention.”18 
On the question of what it is for speakers to mean something by what they say, Searle and 
Davidson both cite the influential analysis of H.P. Grice.  In Grice’s most basic formulation, 
what it is for speaker A to mean something by utterance x is that “A intended the utterance of x to 
produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.”19  In Searle’s 
paraphrase, “In speaking a language I attempt to communicate things to my hearer by means of 
                                                             
16 Scalia, “Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary,” 692. 
 
17 Donald Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” in The Essential Davidson, Donald Davidson, 
with an introduction by Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 257. 
 
18 Searle, 8. 
 
19 H.P. Grice, “Meaning,” The Philosophical Review 66, no. 3 (1957): 385. 
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getting him to recognize my intention to communicate just those things.”20  And in Davidson’s, 
“A speaker cannot . . . intend to mean something by what he says unless he believes his audience 
will interpret his words as he intends (the Gricean circle).”21  Of course the conventional 
meanings of words play an important part in that calculus, too. 
Davidson offers an intriguing account of exactly how convention and intention work 
together to create linguistic meaning.  Although Humpty did not mean what he subsequently 
claimed to have meant, speakers often do mean things that their words, in a strictly conventional 
sense, do not—whether by accident (“Could you pass me that table on the book?”) or 
deliberately (“That’s brilliant!” said sarcastically22).  Davidson is interested to know how 
speakers and interpreters nonetheless communicate successfully in such instances.  His proposal 
is that speakers and interpreters come to each “occasion of utterance” or “speech transaction” in 
possession of a prior theory—speakers with theories of how their utterances will be interpreted, 
and interpreters with theories of what speakers will mean by their utterances.  As the speech 
transaction proceeds, interpreters (and often speakers, too) adjust their prior theories as 
necessary, given all of the new information about their conversation partners gained during the 
transaction.  Thus, “the theory we actually use to interpret an utterance is geared to the 
occasion.”  If and only if a speaker’s theory of how he intends to be interpreted and an 
                                                             
20 Searle, 7. 
 
21 Davidson, 257. 
 
22 Scalia and Garner actually use this example to support their theory of meaning.  They say the fact that the 
words represent sarcasm must be apparent from their “context.”  Scalia and Garner, 25.  One might fairly ask what 
the words are representing, if not the intent of the speaker.  One might also fairly ask what Scalia and Garner mean 
by “context,” and in fact we will ask and attempt to answer that question in Parts IV and VI. 
 
12 
 
interpreter’s theory of how she does interpret the speaker’s utterance (their passing theories) 
coincide is understanding complete.23 
Davidson believes, and I agree, that the problem generalizes.  It is not just 
unconventional uses of words that require adjustments of interpreters’ prior theories.  
Conventions in ordinary language are loose enough so as to require interpreters’ constant 
adjustments to try to get at what a speaker is meaning to convey:  “understanding the speech of 
others depends on it.”24  There is a constant back-and-forth between our prior theories of 
conventional meanings and our passing theories of how speakers are intending to use those 
conventions on particular occasions. 
  
                                                             
23 Davidson, 258-61. 
 
24 Ibid., 259. 
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III.   NO VEHICLES IN THE PARK, REDUX 
 
 
If the foregoing is correct, it would not come as a surprise to find that Scalia and Garner 
face insurmountable difficulty in giving intent-free interpretations of legislation.  Let us return to 
the “no vehicles in the park” statute.  Recall that Scalia and Garner first rejected the definition of 
“vehicle” that pertained to mixing media on the grounds that those kinds of vehicles would not 
likely be in the park in the first place, so they would not need to be excluded.  They then scoured 
the dictionaries for a definition they thought accorded with the “ordinary meaning” of “vehicle” 
and, finding none, made up their own:  a sizable wheeled conveyance.  Finally, they justified 
their invented definition on the grounds that their kind of vehicle would be what is contemplated 
by signs referencing “vehicular traffic.” 
William Eskridge has called Scalia and Garner’s interpretation “an utterly judicious, 
well-informed, and highly illuminating linguistic analysis—but a crazy legal analysis.”25  
Eskridge contends that, in the case of this most brief and ambiguous statute, no judge “can even 
begin to answer the interpretive questions . . . without understanding, from the perspective of the 
legislature and the political culture that produced the statute, what the purpose of the statute 
was.”  Eskridge imagines a world in which the status quo ante involved children too often 
bicycling and motor-scootering into other park visitors, who sustained annoyance and perhaps 
                                                             
25 William N. Eskridge, Jr., “The New Textualism and Normative Canons,” Columbia Law Review 113, 
no. 2 (2013): 560. 
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injuries.  In that scenario, the purpose of the enactment was to safeguard park visitors, and 
clearly it should be interpreted to exclude bicycles.  Eskridge notes that if the statute were 
enacted against a different background—perhaps one featuring complaints about noise and air 
pollution—Scalia and Garner’s interpretation that motor vehicles are banned but bicycles 
allowed would be more apt.  In all events, “knowing the statutory purpose helps us ask the right 
questions.”26 
I disagree with Eskridge’s assessment on two counts.  First, Scalia and Garner do 
attribute an intent to the no-vehicles law.  They rule out the paint-thinner definition of vehicle on 
the grounds that there is no “reason” to exclude mixing media from a park.  But why need there 
be a reason for excluding what the statute excludes?  If Scalia’s theory of meaning is correct, 
then the conventional meanings of the words must accomplish whatever they accomplish entirely 
on their own.  In eliminating one possible conventional meaning by saying there would be no 
reason for the statute to bear that meaning, Scalia and Garner are acknowledging their own 
presupposition that standing behind the statute is some intelligent agent with certain intentions. 
Continuing on, wheeled luggage, grocery carts, and baby carriages are not “commonly 
called” vehicles.  But remember that Scalia and Garner are supposed to be giving the word its 
“reasonable” meaning in light of its “context.”27  Perhaps the park context indicates that the 
prohibition’s extension is not just those things commonly called vehicles in the relevant sense, 
just as it indicated that a conveyance rather than mixing media was the relevant sense of the 
word?  Nor does motorized vehicle “seem right” as a definition because that would include 
miniature remote-controlled cars.  Again, Scalia and Garner do not specify what seems wrong 
                                                             
26 Ibid., 561. 
 
27 Scalia and Garner, 16 (“In their full context, words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the 
time they were written . . . .”). 
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about including remote-controlled cars, but it must be that it does not jibe with the intent of the 
statute they have in mind.  Without such an end in sight, in view of what could they be 
determining which among all of these possibilities is the correct meaning in this case? 
Finally, Scalia and Garner add their own condition that the vehicle must instead be 
“sizable” on the grounds that signs referring to “vehicular traffic” would refer only to sizable 
vehicles.  But whence this allusion to traffic?  Here we have the giveaway that Scalia and Garner 
attribute to the statute the intent of excluding automobiles from the park:  the legislature’s intent 
was to keep the park from being used as a thoroughfare.  I emphasize that nothing in the bare 
prohibition “No person may bring a vehicle into the park” prefers paint thinner to conveyances, 
or baby carriages to remote-controlled cars, or remote-controlled cars to sedans.  The 
differentiation is entirely the function of the intent that Scalia and Garner have imputed to the 
statute, based on their experience of vehicles and parks and imaginings of their possible 
interactions. 
As to my second disagreement with Eskridge:  the problem isn’t the bicycles; it’s the 
planes!  Scalia and Garner contend that a correct reading of the statute would allow airplanes in 
the park, but not automobiles.  I will return to just why that is.  But first let us examine what 
Scalia and Garner take to be guiding their interpretation in the above case:  statutory purpose. 
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IV.   PURPOSE WITHOUT INTENT? 
 
 
Conventional meaning alone is inadequate in almost all cases, and Scalia and Garner 
realize that.  But since they believe they cannot, given their broader commitments, augment 
conventional meaning with speaker intent, they turn to a different additive:  textually manifest 
purpose.28  As the formulation takes pains to indicate, that interpretation-guiding purpose is 
supposed to be expressed entirely by the conventional meanings of the statute’s words.29  “[T]he 
purpose is to be gathered only from the text itself, consistently with the other aspects of its 
context.  The critical word context embraces not just textual purpose but also (1) a word’s 
historical associations acquired from recurrent patterns of past usage, and (2) a word’s immediate 
syntactic setting—that is, the words that surround it in a specific utterance.”30 
In the case just discussed, for instance, “the one purpose unquestionably demonstrated 
from reading the text in context,” according to Scalia and Garner, is “the exclusion from the park 
of things that would otherwise commonly be introduced and that common usage would include 
within the prohibition.”31  Unquestionably there is a purpose to the statute of excluding things 
from the park—whether those need be such things as are commonly introduced or commonly 
                                                             
28 Scalia and Garner say variously that the purpose is “manifested by,” “derived from,” “apparent from,” 
and “evident from” the text, and perhaps some others.  I subsume all of these under “textually manifest purpose.” 
 
29 I say “expressed” for lack of a more precise word.  Scalia and Garner are not clear on the nature of the 
relation of conventional meaning to purpose, as we will see. 
 
30 Scalia and Garner, 33. 
 
31 Ibid., 38. 
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called “vehicles” is less apparent.  But more to the point, this freestanding “purpose” looks a lot 
like what we might ordinarily call the author’s intent.  My contention is that the vague notion of 
purpose (and its cousin, context) is in the final analysis simply the intent Scalia and Garner 
impute to the enacting legislature.  This section will take the form of a critique in practice, 
demonstrating how imputed intent factors in interpretations throughout Scalia and Garner’s 
treatise.32 
 
a.   Canons that Rely on Conversational Implicature 
 
 
One kind of imputed intent that recurs frequently in the treatise is conversational 
implicature, on which several of Scalia and Garner’s canons rely.  First explicated by H.P. Grice, 
conversational implicature is the phenomenon of a speaker’s intending to convey, and an 
interpreter’s understanding that intention to convey, something that the speaker’s utterance does 
not expressly state or logically imply.  The implicature succeeds in meaning something because 
both the speaker and the hearer assume that the speech transaction is going to proceed in 
accordance with certain governing communicative principles or maxims.33 
We see conversational implicature at work in Scalia and Garner’s discussion of the 
omitted-case canon (“Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus 
                                                             
32 This is the “if it looks, walks, and quacks” section of the paper. 
 
33 H.P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Speech Acts, vol. 3 of Syntax and Semantics, ed. Peter Cole and 
Jerry L. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41-58.  Grice distinguishes between conventional implicature 
and conversational implicature.  Unlike conversational implicature, conventional implicature does not rely on the 
assumption that the speaker is complying with certain communicative maxims in order to communicate his or her 
intent, but rather relies on conventions of semantics or syntax—for instance, that we order clauses according to time 
sequence.  “They put on their bathing suits and went to the beach” does not strictly say that they put on their bathing 
suits before going to the beach, but it certainly implicates it.  Conventional implicature would not seem to pose a 
challenge for textualism. 
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omissus pro omisso habendus est).  That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not 
covered.”34).  The Maryland Court of Appeals was presented the question whether the state’s 
election statute required that referendum petitions be signed legibly in order that an elections 
board could determine whether the petitioner’s name was signed “as it appears on the statewide 
voter registration list.”  The court decided not, and Scalia and Garner approve:  “The court noted 
that the legislature could have added legibility as a prerequisite for validation, as several other 
states have done.  But in the absence of such a penmanship prerequisite, the Board could not 
create one.”35  If, however, the statute had not required that a printed name also appear on the 
petition, then legibility of the signature may have been an implicit requirement.36  “The omitted-
case canon—the principle that what a text does not provide is unprovided—must sometimes be 
reconciled with the principle that a text does include not only what is express but also what is 
implicit.”37 
The negative-implication canon (“The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of 
others (expression unius est exclusion alterius).”38) depends completely on conversational 
implicature.  As we encounter this “communicative device” so often in our daily lives, Scalia and 
Garner illustrate it first with some mundane, non-legal examples.  “When a car dealer promises a 
low financing rate to ‘purchasers with good credit,’ it is entirely clear that the rate is not 
available to purchasers with spotty credit.”  The important thing to note here is that the exclusion 
                                                             
34 Scalia and Garner, 93. 
 
35 Ibid., 95.  That the legislature could have done otherwise is a strange justification to rely on for authors 
who deny that legislative intent exists. 
 
36 Ibid., 97. 
 
37 Ibid., 96. 
 
38 Ibid., 107. 
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of bad credit risks from the offer is not a function of the conventional meanings of the words 
themselves, nor of logical implication.  Rather, we infer that the car dealer intends not to extend 
the offer to them, on the assumption that the dealer is complying with standard communicative 
maxims—perhaps the maxim “Do not make your contribution more informative than is 
required,” or the maxim “Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”39  Furthermore, “[t]he doctrine 
properly applies only when the unius (or technically, unum, the thing specified) can reasonably 
be thought to be an expression of all that shares in the grant or prohibition involved”: 
The sign outside a restaurant “No dogs allowed” cannot be thought to mean that 
no other creatures are excluded—as if pet monkeys, potbellied pigs, and baby 
elephants might be quite welcome.  Dogs are specifically addressed because they 
are the animals that customers are most likely to bring in; nothing is implied about 
other animals.40 
 
Why exactly does the canon not apply to “no dogs allowed”?  Scalia and Garner slip into the 
passive voice here, which they often do when trying not to mention the subject behind the 
language, but the reason they offer is plainly about that subject’s likely intentions:  “Dogs are 
specifically addressed because they are the animals that customers are most likely to bring in; 
nothing is implied about other animals.”  There is no other way in which this canon can 
operate—and no other basis on which it can be determined not to apply.  The same goes for the 
following:  the surplusage canon (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given 
effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda).  None should be ignored.  None should needlessly be 
given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no 
consequence.”)41; the general/specific canon (“If there is a conflict between a general provision 
                                                             
39 Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” 45-46. 
 
40 Scalia and Garner, 107. 
 
41 Ibid., 174. 
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and a specific provision, the specific provision prevails (generalia specialibus non 
derogant).”)42; the associated-words canon (“Associated words bear on one another’s meaning 
(noscitur a sociis).”)43; and the ejusdem generis canon (“Where general words follow an 
enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the same general kind 
or class specifically mentioned (ejusdem generis).”).44 
 
b.   Canons that Expressly Presuppose Legislative Intent 
 
 
The very existence of the reenactment canon can only be justified in terms of legislative 
intent.  That canon provides, “If the legislature amends or reenacts a provision other than by way 
of a consolidating statute or restyling project, a significant change in language is presumed to 
entail a change in meaning.”  Scalia and Garner effectively concede that this canon requires 
consideration of legislative intent: 
We oppose the use of legislative history, which consists of the hearings, 
committee reports, and debate leading up to the enactment in question (see § 66).  
But quite separate from legislative history is statutory history—the statutes 
appealed or amended by the statute under consideration.  These form part of the 
context of the statute, and (unlike legislative history) can properly be presumed to 
have been before all the members of the legislature when they voted.  So a change 
in the language of a prior statute presumably connotes a change in meaning.45 
 
Recall that Scalia and Garner’s primary objection to judicial resort to legislative intent is that 
legislative intent does not exist.  Yet here they defend the reenactment canon precisely on the 
                                                             
42 Ibid., 183. 
 
43 Ibid., 195. 
 
44 Ibid., 199. 
 
45 Ibid., 256 (second emphasis added). 
 
21 
 
ground that there is a legislative meeting of the minds over the import of a particular change in 
statutory language.  By way of example, Scalia and Garner cite a Texas appellate court dispute 
over whether a person who had enjoyed custody of a child for an aggregative, though not 
consecutive, six months counted under the Texas Family Code as “a person who has had actual 
care, control, and possession of [a] child for not less than six months preceding the filing of the 
petition.”  The prior version of the statute had included the word “immediately” before 
“preceding,” and Scalia and Garner say that change alone should have decided the case.46  That 
can only be because they conclude the Texas legislature intended deletion of the word 
“immediately” to make a substantive difference—on its own, “six months preceding the filing” 
certainly admits of an interpretation requiring consecutive custody. 
A more famous example of a canon of this type is the absurdity doctrine (“A provision 
may be either disregarded or judicially corrected as an error (when the correction is textually 
simple) if failing to do so would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could 
approve.”47).  No one suggests, say Scalia and Garner, that judges may not transpose letters in 
obviously misspelled words.  The line between such scrivener’s errors and drafter’s errors, which 
make grammatical sense but produce evaluative absurdities, “is generally not a principled one”:  
“In both cases we are not revising the apparent meaning of the text but are giving it the meaning 
that it would convey to a reasonable person, who would understand that misprints had 
occurred.”48  One wonders what the word “apparent” means in that remark; it cannot signify the 
                                                             
46 Ibid.  Amusingly, Scalia and Garner accuse the court of taking a purposivist approach for reasoning that 
the purpose of the statute was to accord standing only upon those with a current relationship with the child.  Better 
to have said the court was purposivist in the wrong way (see Part VI below).  First remove the plank from your own 
eye . . . . 
 
47 Ibid., 234.  See also John F. Manning, “The Absurdity Doctrine,” Harvard Law Review 116, no. 8 
(2003): 2387, arguing the doctrine is incompatible with textualism. 
 
48 Ibid., 235 (emphasis added). 
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conventional meaning of the text.  Scalia and Garner certainly seem to be revising (or approving 
the revising) of the meaning of the text in the examples they give:  “the winning party must pay 
the other side’s reasonable attorney’s fees” should be read to say the “losing party”49; “Chapter 
601 offenses” should be read as “driving-without-insurance offenses,” else a defendant be 
allowed to produce a car insurance policy as a defense to driving on a suspended license50; and 
“All laws and parts of laws are hereby repealed” should be read to say “All laws and parts of 
laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed,” lest the state of Arkansas be plunged into 
anarchy.51 
Scalia and Garner try to forestall a charge of purposivism here by explaining that averting 
absurdity is still a “basis” for a judgment and not a “purpose” of a judgment.52  Yet “sanity of 
outcome” is not a basis for a judgment of what words mean, which is all that textualism is 
supposed to concern itself with.  Scalia and Garner say too that, as long as the result would be 
                                                             
49 Ibid.  “That is entirely absurd, and it is virtually certain that winning party was meant to be losing party.”  
One might wonder, meant by whom? 
 
50 Ibid., 236.  In this case a Texan was convicted of driving with a suspended license.  At the time, a Texas 
statute provided that presenting to the court a valid car insurance policy was an absolute defense to “Chapter 601 
offenses.”  The legislature had overlooked (or, as Scalia and Garner say in the passive voice, it “was obviously an 
error”) that Chapter 601 included not just the offense of driving without insurance but also that of driving without a 
license.  So if given its conventional meaning, the defense would have allowed the defendant to produce an 
insurance policy as a defense to the charge of driving without a license. 
 
Scalia and Garner justify the court’s decision by the fact that the legislature amended the statute in question 
shortly thereafter to apply only to driving-without-insurance cases.  The authors are of course right that the court got 
the legislature’s intent correct.  But a textualist cannot make that argument.  Moreover, their reasoning is precisely 
backwards from their reasoning at multiple other places where they say courts’ hewing to a close reading of statutes 
enforces bad law (their job) and thereby prompts legislatures to write better ones (their job).  Ibid., 301, 344.  Heads, 
I win; tails, you lose. 
 
51 Ibid., 236-37.  The Arkansas legislature had a practice of appending the boilerplate “All laws and parts of 
laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed” to its bills.  In this case, the drafters left out the critical “in conflict 
herewith,” with the result that, had the court closed its eyes to legislative intent and enforced the law as written, the 
entire state code would have been eradicated. 
 
52 Ibid., 235. 
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truly absurd and the fix simple, that is enough to “absolve the doctrine of the charge that it is an 
application not of textualism but of purposivism—seeking to give the text not the meaning that it 
objectively conveys but the meaning that was in the mind of the drafter.”53  The word 
“objective” is getting a very liberal construction here.  Recall Davidson’s point that 
malapropisms and other fumble-mouthing can be made sense of only in light of what we take to 
be the speaker’s intent.54 
 
c.   Canons that Establish Rebuttable Presumptions 
 
 
A number of the canons are styled “presumptions”:  the presumption against 
ineffectiveness, the presumption of validity,55 the presumption of nonexclusive “include,”56 the 
                                                             
53 Ibid., 238. 
 
54 Another canon that expressly presupposes legislative intent is the flip side of the reenactment canon, the 
prior-construction canon (“If a statute uses words or phrases that have already received authoritative construction by 
the jurisdiction’s court of last resort, or even uniform construction by inferior courts or a responsible administrative 
agency, they are to be understood according to that construction.”).  Ibid., 322.  Scalia and Garner do all they can to 
justify this canon by resort to the settled expectations of the bar rather than the “fanciful presumption of legislative 
knowledge” of the relevant judicial or administrative interpretation.  Query first the compatibility of such a defense 
with the authors’ democratic commitment that legislatures make the law.  But the authors moot the point in the end:  
“this canon applies only to presumed legislative approval of prior judicial or administrative interpretations.”  Ibid., 
326 (emphasis added). 
 
Finally, I would contend that the presumption against ineffectiveness (“A textually permissible 
interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored.”  Ibid., 63.) is no more 
defensible on the textualist program than is the absurdity doctrine.  The Slave Trade Act of 1794 disallowed any 
person to “prepare[] any ship or vessel, within any port or place of the said United States . . . for the purpose of 
carrying on any trade or traffic in slaves.”  Shipowners argued that “prepare” meant to complete preparations.  Scalia 
and Garner approve the Supreme Court’s holding the other way:  the shipowners’ interpretation would have 
rendered the law ineffective.  Ibid., 63-64.  But ineffective at what?  Once we rise above the conventional meaning 
of the text, we can only be pursuing authorial intent.  See Parts IV.d and V.b below. 
 
55 “An interpretation that validates outweighs one that invalidates (ut res magis valeat quam pereat).”  
Ibid., 66. 
 
56 “The verb to include introduces examples, not an exhaustive list.”  Ibid., 132. 
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presumption of consistent usage,57 the presumption against retroactivity,58 the presumption 
against waiver of sovereign immunity,59 the presumption against federal preemption,60 the 
presumption against implied right of action,61 the presumption against change in common law,62 
and the presumption against implied repeal.63  As to each of these canons we must ask, how is an 
interpretive presumption overcome?  How is an interpreter to know when the presumption is 
inapplicable to a particular text? 
Take the presumption against federal preemption.  Scalia and Garner’s discussion of this 
canon focuses not on directly conflicting commands, in which event federal law trumps state 
law, but rather on the trickier question of field preemption:  “Sometimes . . . the federal statute is 
meant to establish a maximum standard or requirement on which everyone can rely . . . .”64  Note 
that Scalia and Garner are already having difficulty avoiding intent language in this discussion.  
It only gets more difficult:  “Even if Congress has not enacted such an express [preemption] 
provision, state law will be preempted ‘when Congress intends federal law to occupy the 
                                                             
57 “A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms 
suggests a variation in meaning.”  Ibid., 170. 
 
58 “A statute presumptively has no retroactive application.”  Ibid., 261. 
 
59 “A statute does not waive sovereign immunity—and a federal statute does not eliminate state sovereign 
immunity—unless that disposition is unequivocally clear.”  Ibid., 281. 
 
60 “A federal statute is presumed to supplement rather than displace state law.”  Ibid., 290. 
 
61 “A statute’s mere prohibition of a certain act does not imply creation of a private right of action for its 
violation.  The creation of such a right must be either express or clearly implied from the text of the statute.”  Ibid., 
313. 
 
62 “A statute will be construed to alter the common law only when that disposition is clear.”  Ibid., 318. 
 
63 “Repeals by implication are disfavored—‘very much disfavored.’  But a provision that flatly contradicts 
an earlier-enacted provision repeals it.”  Ibid., 327. 
 
64 Ibid., 290. 
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field.’”65  And still worse:  “[T]he preemption canon ought not to be applied to the text of an 
explicit preemption provision. . . .  The reason is obvious:  The presumption is based on an 
assumption of what Congress, in our federal system, would or should normally desire.  But when 
Congress has explicitly set forth its desire, there is no justification for not taking Congress at its 
word.”66 
If an interpretive presumption is to have any effect, it must mean that we are going to 
start by reading the words of a statute to mean one thing rather than another (semantic 
presumptions), or to relate to each other in a certain way (syntactic presumptions), or to bring 
about or not to bring about a particular outcome (policy presumptions)—until it becomes clear 
that the legislature meant to do otherwise.  The words are not, to begin with, to be given their 
most natural reading.  Rather they are skewed one way or the other, absent a clear showing of 
contrary legislative intent.  How else could an interpretive presumption operate? 
Some of the canons not titled “presumption of x” are presumptions nonetheless.  One 
example is the extraterritoriality canon (“A statute presumptively has no extraterritorial 
application (statute suo clauduntur territorio, nec ultra territorium disponunt).”67).  And here 
again appeal to legislative intent is inescapable:  “It has long been assumed that legislatures enact 
their laws with this territorial limitation in mind.”68  Because we presume that legislatures do not 
intend to make rules for lands in which they are not sovereign, we interpret words with facially 
global geographic scope to have a much more limited ambit.  That is, we do so until it becomes 
                                                             
65 Ibid., 291 (quoting Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  The authors follow immediately with the caveat that such intent “must derive from the 
text of the federal laws and not from such extraneous sources as legislative history.”  More on this below. 
 
66 Ibid., 293. 
 
67 Ibid., 268. 
 
68 Ibid. 
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plain that the legislature intended the law to reach beyond its territorial boundaries.  Scalia and 
Garner give the example of the Second Circuit’s construction of a federal statute criminalizing 
travel in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a minor.  “Congress 
does not intend a statute to apply to conduct outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States,” the court said, “unless it clearly expresses its intent to do so.”69  In this case it had. 
In a sense, all of the canons are rebuttable presumptions.  Scalia and Garner say as much 
in their Prefatory Remarks:  “Properly regarded, they [i.e., the canons] are not ‘rules’ of 
interpretation in any strict sense but presumptions about what an intelligently produced text 
conveys.”70  One of their Fundamental Principles is the principle of interrelating canons:  “No 
canon of interpretation is absolute.  Each may be overcome by the strength of differing principles 
that point in other directions.”71  If that is so, then the remarks above about how interpretive 
presumptions are overcome—by the interpreter’s recognition of the legislature’s intent to do 
so—apply to the functioning of the canons across the board.  But for now let us postpone 
reaching that conclusion and assess rather how Scalia and Garner might respond to this point.  
Here is our situation, put in Davidsonian terms.  Scalia and Garner have recommended a prior 
theory of legal interpretation.  Interpreters should approach a legal text in the expectation that it 
will communicate in accordance with certain principles.  When the text does not cooperate, it 
falls to the interpreter to make the necessary adjustments in order to come to a successful passing 
theory:  “The skill of sound construction lies in assessing the clarity and weight of each clue and 
                                                             
69 Ibid., 271 (quoting United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 
70 Ibid., 51. 
 
71 Ibid., 59.  “Principles of interpretation are guides to solving the puzzle of textual meaning, and as in any 
good mystery, different clues often point in different directions.”  Ibid. 
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deciding where the balance lies.”72  But what guides the adjusting?  How do interpreters know 
when they have found that balance, the correct interpretation? 
 
d.   The Metaphysics and Epistemology of “Purpose” 
 
 
So far in this part, I have tried to identify from among Scalia and Garner’s canons groups 
that require consideration of legislative intent in distinct ways.  In particular the group just 
discussed, canons that establish interpretive presumptions, seem to rely on legislative intent in a 
way that generalizes to all of the canons.  At this point, I must concede that Scalia and Garner 
could reply in each of these cases that what is guiding the application of the canons is not 
legislative intent but rather the purpose that is evident from the text of the legislation.  But just 
what is this purpose?  And how do we identify it? 
Scalia and Garner discuss purpose quite a lot in the earlier sections of the treatise, usually 
in the service of contrasting textualism with its rival purposivism.  They say first that their 
opposition to purposivism does not mean textualists do not consider a text’s purpose:  “[T]he 
textualist routinely takes purpose into account, but in its concrete manifestations  as deduced 
from close reading of the text.”  For the purposivist, on the other hand, “abstract purpose is 
allowed to supersede text.”  Put another way, the purposivist “goes beyond the immediate 
purpose evident from the text (climbs the ladder of generality) to find another purpose.”73  This 
concrete-versus-abstract purpose distinction is a theme for Scalia and Garner.  Another of their 
Fundamental Principles is the supremacy-of-text principle (“The words of a governing text are of 
                                                             
72 Ibid. 
 
73 Ibid., 20. 
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paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.”).  Under this 
precept follows most of their direct explication of purpose and its role.  Words are given 
meaning by their context, Scalia and Garner say, and context always includes purpose.  But that 
purpose (1) “must be derived from the text, not from extrinsic sources such as legislative history 
or an assumption about the legal drafter’s desires,” (2) “is to be described as concretely as 
possible, not abstractly,” and (3) except in the case of a scrivener’s error, “cannot be used to 
contradict text or supplement it.”74 
The obvious question here is, why do Scalia and Garner’s objections to judicial reliance 
on legislative intent not apply with equal force to reliance on purpose?  Its existence and 
knowability are just as dubious as intent’s—moreso, I submit.  Where does it come from?  Scalia 
and Garner insist that it is “evident” or “apparent” or “manifest” in the words themselves, but 
such cryptic relations don’t get us very far.  It must be abstract to some degree.  If it were 
entirely concrete, it would be the mere conventional meanings of the words and phrases in 
relations dictated by their syntax and grammar, which would provide no guide for resolving 
vagueness or ambiguity, implicature or absurdity, or for applying or rebutting any interpretive 
presumption.  Perhaps the textualist might respond that even if purpose is not concrete, it is still 
grounded in the text in a way that intent is not.  I cannot see how that could be, and Scalia and 
Garner offer no analysis of this mysterious text-purpose relation.  They talk as if purpose arises 
                                                             
74 Ibid., 56-57.  The third condition strikes me as a corollary to Scalia and Garner’s claim regarding the 
absurdity doctrine that it is founded on the “basis for the judgment” and not the “purpose of the judgment.”  As I 
said above, that claim makes little sense, so I would include cases of absurdity here, along with scrivener’s errors, as 
exceptions when purpose is allowed to contradict the text. 
 
Scalia and Garner also include a fourth condition (on their list, it’s the second):  purpose must be defined 
precisely and not in a way that “smuggles in the answer to the question before the decision-maker.”  But what if the 
textually manifest purpose plainly does answer the interpretive question?  It seems to me that Scalia and Garner’s 
next condition, that purpose must be defined as concretely as possible, would prevent such smuggling. 
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sua sponte from the words themselves (whereas to find intent we must plumb the psychology of 
every individual legislator).  Is it not a much more plausible explanation that the purpose Scalia 
and Garner are “deriving” from the text is actually the intent they are imputing or attributing to 
the collective legislative author? 
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V.   FROM SCALIAN TEXTUALISM TO HYPOTHETICAL INTENTIONALISM 
 
 
Textualism is not inevitably consigned to cling to such inscrutables as purpose and 
context.  There is another conventional-meaning auxiliary of which textualists can avail 
themselves while still keeping faith with their core commitments:  hypothetical legislative intent. 
 
a.   Textually Manifest Purpose and the Reasonable Reader 
 
 
In his 1997 essay A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia remarked that what judges are 
looking for is not any subjective intent of the legislature but rather its “objectified” intent, “the 
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the 
remainder of the corpus juris.”75  As we have seen, by the 2012 treatise Scalia had expunged 
such approving references to legislative intent, objectified or otherwise, and had replaced them 
with references to the legislation’s textually manifest purpose.  I tend to think the change was 
stylistic, not substantive:  Scalia and Garner wanted to avoid any confusion that might be sown 
by attempting to distinguish a permissible objectified intent from an impermissible subjective 
one. 
                                                             
75 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 17. 
 
31 
 
Yet even in the treatise there are a few provisional statements that could make the reader 
think Scalia and Garner are on the verge of endorsing an “objectified” intent view:  “Traditional 
authorities on interpretation, while repeating the mantra that the objective of interpretation is to 
discern the lawgiver’s or private drafter’s intent, would add that this intent is to be derived solely 
from the words of the text.  We would have no substantive quarrel with the search for ‘intent’ if 
that were all that was meant.”76  Why then, in the end, do they reject the view that legal texts 
should be interpreted in light of the intent imputed to their authors?  Because “describing the 
interpretive exercise as a search for ‘intent’ inevitably causes readers to think of subjective 
intent, as opposed to the objective words that the drafters agreed to in their expression of rights 
and duties. . . .  Speculation about [subjective intent] . . . invites fuzzy-mindedness.  Objective 
meaning is what we are after, and it enhances clarity to speak that way.”77 
To the contrary, asserting objective meaning in light of the text’s “purpose” or 
“context”—or simply saying the answer to the interpretive question is obvious to any 
“reasonable” reader—yields not clarity but confusion, with a whiff of arbitrariness.  Some 
commentators have complained of the treatise’s ad hoc feel, with this canon prevailing in this 
instance, that canon in another, and no further explanation than Scalia and Garner’s saying the 
result is required by principles of sound interpretation, which conclusion is apparent to the 
reasonable reader.78  That is Scalia and Garner’s polestar, the “fair reading”:  “determining the 
                                                             
76 Scalia and Garner, 30. 
 
77 Ibid. 
 
78 In reply to Scalia and Garner’s citing Judge Harold Leventhal’s famous quip that using legislative history 
is like “entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s friends,” Eskridge 
retorts that “using the canons is like inviting only your friends to a cocktail party and then picking out those friends 
who best serve your purposes on this particular occasion.”  Eskridge, 544.  Elsewhere:  “Indeed, their exegesis of 
dozens of canons actually undermines the conceptual theses of the book and of Scalia’s legisprudence.”  Eskridge, 
535-36.  And Judge Richard Posner skewered the treatise for “reveling in absurdity” and exhibiting “a pattern of 
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application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully 
competent in the language, would have understood its text at the time it was issued.”79  But just 
who is the “reasonable reader”?  It is the interpretive counterpart to the familiar “reasonable 
person” from tort law: 
In our view, the fair meaning of a statutory text is determined by a similar 
objectivizing construct—the “reasonable reader,” a reader who is aware of all the 
elements (such as the canons) bearing on the meaning of the text, and whose 
judgment regarding their effects is invariably sound.  Never mind that no such 
person exists.  Without positing his existence—as tort law posits the existence of 
the “reasonable person”—we could never subject the meaning of a statute to an 
objective test.80 
 
But there is a critical difference between tort law and statutory interpretation, which 
Scalia and Garner went to considerable lengths, at the very beginning of the treatise, to draw out.  
Tort law (at least the parts of it where the reasonable person still abides) is common law, and 
judges make the common law.  “It was true, that is, that judges did not really ‘find’ the common 
law but invented it over time.  Yet this notion has been stretched into a belief that judges ‘make’ 
law through judicial interpretation of democratically enacted statutes.”81  The reasonable non-
tortious person is therefore the product of judicial exercise of reflective equilibrium.  The judge 
presented a materially new set of facts asks herself, is it fair to hold the defendant liable in this 
situation?  Should we in this jurisdiction expect people to do more than the defendant did to 
avoid a harmful result, or did the defendant act reasonably?  The answer will be entirely a matter 
of the judge’s own moral intuitions and considered beliefs. 
                                                             
equivocation.”  Richard A. Posner, “The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia,” The New Republic, August 23, 2012, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism. 
 
79 Scalia and Garner, 33. 
 
80 Ibid., 393. 
 
81 Ibid., 5. 
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That is decidedly not how legislative interpretation is supposed to work, on Scalia and 
Garner’s theory.  “[G]ood judges dealing with statutes do not make law.  They do not ‘give new 
content’ to the statute, but merely apply the content that has been there all along, awaiting 
application to myriad factual scenarios.”82  Unlike in the common-law context, the judge is not 
determining what the law should be but rather discerning what it is.  And in that endeavor the 
construct of the reasonable reader is of no help.  What do we know about the reasonable reader?  
He knows conventional meanings and grammar and the canons of construction, and his 
interpretation is always “fair” or “sound.”  But how do we know which is the fair or sound 
interpretation?  Well, it is the one the reasonable reader would give.  And now we have a 
problem.  It appears the fair reading and the reasonable reader are going to be forever pointing 
unhelpfully at each other.  We need a truth-maker. 
 
b.   Hypothetical Intentionalism 
 
 
I would like to propose one.  Let us try changing the question from “What interpretation 
would the reasonable reader give?” to “What did the legislature intend here?”  This new 
interpretation-guiding question will not necessarily involve us in a quest for what Scalia and 
Garner call “subjective intent,” or the actual mental states of individual legislators.  Nor does it 
require resort to legislative history.  Rather, we simply read the legislative text as if it were the 
product of a single author.  What it means then is what we take the author to be 
saying.  Conventional meaning still plays a very important role in that assessment, but so does 
our inference of what the author intends to convey. 
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In the world of art criticism, this relationship of authorship to meaning—i.e., the facially 
apparent intent of the artist is what determines the artwork’s meaning—is termed “hypothetical” 
intentionalism.  It stands in opposition to “actual” intentionalism, which holds, predictably, that 
the meaning of the work is determined only by what its author actually intended, whether we 
could infer that intent from the art or not.  I submit that hypothetical intentionalism is largely 
what is going on in textualist interpretations, anyway, as I have tried to demonstrate via all of the 
examples in the previous parts.  The textually manifest purpose that Scalia and Garner say guides 
their interpretation is really just the intent they impute to the hypothetical legislative author. 
 
i.   Objection #1:  Just a semantic dispute? 
 
 
If textualists like Scalia and Garner are unwittingly repairing to hypothetical legislative 
intent anyway, then why urge its adoption as their express guiding principle?  Why think this any 
more than a semantic point?  Well for starters, Scalia and Garner do not always allow themselves 
to be guided by hypothetical legislative intent.  Recall “no vehicles in the park.”  As we saw, 
Scalia and Garner imputed to the legislature an intent to keep some things out of the park that 
otherwise would likely be in the park and, more important, that those things to be excluded were 
things that on roadways would contribute to traffic.  But then they go one step more.  They apply 
the ordinary-meaning canon83 to conclude that “vehicle” does not include airplanes, so they are 
permitted in the park.  And now we have descended into madness. 
                                                             
83 For the first time in their analysis, I believe.  Scalia and Garner purported to be searching for the 
definition of vehicle by way of application of the ordinary-meaning canon all along.  But as I emphasized in Part III, 
in fact the definition of vehicle they settled on, and those they ruled out, had more to do with the intent they had 
already imputed to the legislature than it did any ordinariness of meaning.  How ordinary can a meaning be if it does 
not appear in any reputable dictionary? 
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First of all, theirs is not a particularly rigorous ordinary-meaning analysis, even assuming 
that whether airplane fits the ordinary meaning of vehicle is an appropriate inquiry at this 
stage.  An airplane is sizable, wheeled, and a conveyance, so it is unclear how Scalia and Garner 
can exclude it, even after they have formulated a definition expressly to exclude a number of 
things they didn’t want to call “vehicles” (recall the baby carriages, grocery carts, and remote-
controlled cars).  The only reason they give for ruling out airplanes from the ordinary meaning is 
that Justice Holmes once wrote that airplane theft is not covered under the National Motor 
Vehicle Theft Act.  But Holmes was construing a statute governing the theft of motor vehicles, 
after all, not vehicles simpliciter.84  In any event, the more important point is that the imputed 
legislative intent, once the ordinary-meaning canon has been applied, is incoherent.  
Automobiles are forbidden because the legislature intended (according to Scalia and Garner’s 
imputation) to keep out the kind of things that make for traffic—”sizable wheeled 
conveyances”—yet it is okay if park-goers taxi their Gulfstreams down the walking path?  On 
the intention Scalia and Garner first impute, the legislature could not have intended the result that 
airplanes be allowed in the park. 
Fortunately, the ordinary-meaning canon makes but few appearances in the remainder of 
the treatise.  That is so because Scalia and Garner almost always interpret the words at issue in a 
text in light of the intent they attribute to the enacting legislature, not on the basis of some 
contrived “ordinary meaning.”  Which throws us back onto the original objection:  why insist on 
hypothetical legislative intent in place of textually manifest purpose?  At this point I will 
                                                             
84 Furthermore, as Scalia and Garner footnote a hundred-some-odd pages later, Holmes was applying the 
ejusdem generis canon, not any ordinary-meaning rule.  The relevant word “vehicle” appeared in the list 
“automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for 
running on rails.”  Scalia and Garner, 200.  One begins to suspect Scalia and Garner were hiding the ball here for 
rhetorical purposes.  In their zeal they failed to notice that intent was guiding their analysis and that airplanes met all 
three criteria of their custom-tailored “ordinary meaning.” 
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concede that if Scalia and Garner made purpose their bellwether, I would have little to quarrel 
with.  If they did so, I would lay down my weapons—just about (see immediately below for a 
remaining conceptual issue and Part VI for a methodological one).  But they do not do 
so.  Rather, only one of their fifty-seven principles and canons is dedicated to purpose in and of 
itself, and even that one does all it can to cabin the role purpose plays:  it is no accident that it is 
titled the “supremacy-of-text principle.”  One of those limitations is that the purpose that is 
apparent from the text may in no event “supplement” or “supersede” the text.  But as I explicated 
in Part II and demonstrated repeatedly in Parts III and IV, that purpose, or hypothetical intent, 
always supplements the text.  It is what guides the interpreter in deciding whether to apply a 
given canon or to follow one rather than another when they conflict, as happens not 
infrequently.  Sometimes Scalia and Garner acknowledge purpose (or hypothetical intent) 
expressly; most times they are guided by it seemingly unawares; and on rare occasions they 
sense its presence and remember not to let it “supersede” the text—and we get airplanes in parks. 
An ancillary benefit of making the switch from textually manifest purpose to hypothetical 
intent is that it would sync up the vocabulary of legislative interpretation with that of the 
philosophy of language and thereby afford some analytic clarity.  As discussed in Part II, 
language philosophers have been analyzing linguistic meaning in terms of convention and 
intention for decades.  And the metaphysics of speaker intent are much more straightforward 
than those of textual purpose.  Of course all of us are familiar with the phenomenon of first 
having a thought and then attempting to convey it in speech or writing.  This ordering is what 
Searle means when he says thought has original or intrinsic intentionality, whereas language has 
derived intentionality.85  Scalia and Garner never analyze the relationship of purpose or context 
                                                             
85 John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983). 
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to the textual conventions of semantics, syntax, grammar, and punctuation.  The little they do say 
makes it sound as if the purpose somehow arises from the language.  That gets the sequence of 
intentionality precisely backwards.  Texts do not have purposes ex nihilo, independent of any 
intelligent agent’s intentions.  Thinking that meaning can be sought without consideration of 
speaker intent is a conceptual confusion that can lead to inchoate, occasionally inscrutable 
interpretations, as we have seen.86 
A final point to make in this connection concerns the canons.  If hypothetical intent is 
ultimately to guide legislative interpretation, what becomes of them?  Basically, they play the 
same role they do now, except we are more candid about it.  The canons are good guides to 
legislative drafting insofar as they alert legislators to the grammatical, syntactic, and policy 
presumptions with which judges will approach their handiwork.  But ultimately their citation in 
judicial opinions is a matter of ex post justification, not ex ante analysis.  Once the concession is 
made that the canons are not self-executing, then the choice whether to apply one or another in a 
particular case must be made in view of something—which must be the intent the judge has 
imputed to the legislative author.  The canons are thus reduced to descriptors of intent-guided 
interpretations. 
                                                             
86 Although it doesn’t have to.  The textualist might respond that intent is perhaps perfectly accessible from 
the speaker’s side of the speech transaction, but not nearly so transparent from the interpreter’s side.  Even if the 
speaker makes his or her intent as plain as possible, the interpreter still cannot get inside the speaker’s head and peer 
into his or her subjective psychological state. 
 
So maybe intent is not actually the most fundamental constituent of meaning from the interpreter’s 
side.  Intent itself must be inferred on the basis of some more fundamental element, which could very well be the 
purpose of the communication that the interpreter believes to be the most likely.  (Davidson realized that something 
like this must be informing the interpreter’s attribution of intent to the speaker and suggested, as a start, that we 
proceed on the assumption that speakers hold beliefs that we believe to be true.  See Donald Davidson, “Radical 
Interpretation,” Dialectica 27, no. 1 (1973): 314-28.) 
 
But a metaphysical-epistemological grounding of purpose along these lines does not appear in Scalia and 
Garner’s treatise.  As it is, they seem to be not very sure what purpose is or where it comes from, which is perhaps 
why they merely include it amongst the canons rather than according it its proper place as governing their 
application. 
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ii.   Objection #2:  Can a pretense really get us content? 
 
 
Confirming evidence that this is not a mere verbal dispute comes in Scalia and Garner’s 
express rejection of the hypothetical-intent alternative.  In his review of Law’s Quandary, Scalia 
remarks, “If the notion that language means whatever its author intends it to mean is strange, 
stranger still is the notion that the author need not be a real author but can be a hypothetical one. 
. . .  The problem is not simply . . . that we cannot posit an adequate hypothetical author.  It is 
that, even if we could, the law that would result would be a hypothetical law (whose violation 
would presumably be punishable by hypothetical incarceration).”87  Here again we find Scalia 
knocking down straw men because of his failure to grasp that convention and intention do not 
mutually exclude one another but rather complement one another.  Just as no one is arguing (or 
very few are arguing) that “language means whatever its author intends,” almost no one is 
arguing that a real author is dispensable.  I say almost no one because actually Scalia himself 
takes that very position—recall his “LEAVE HERE OR DIE” example (and the parallel treatise 
examples, which I footnoted, of the Bob Hope joke authored by the desert wind and the King 
Lear edition authored by the thousand monkeys). 
Presumably Scalia’s point here is that the words of the statute are the law, and 
contemplation of legislative intent will result either in (a) a Humpty Dumpty theory of meaning 
by which individual legislators’ intentions, expressed somewhere in the legislative history, will 
cause the statutory language to mean something contrary to its conventional meaning; or (b) 
untethered invention by judges who apply the Humpty Dumpty theory but without even 
                                                             
87 Scalia, “Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary,” 693. 
39 
 
consulting the legislative history, preferring instead to make up the intentions of their own made-
up legislators.  But, as I hope by now is coming clear to the reader, we needn’t arrive at either of 
these undesirable results.  Rather, we read the statutory text as if it were the work of a single 
author with certain intentions, which is what we inevitably do when reading a work of multiple 
authors—take Scalia and Garner’s treatise, for example.  When an interpretive question arises, 
we answer it with an eye toward the intent that the language conveys.  In a favorite bromide of 
Scalia and Garner’s (though not one they adhere to faithfully), we “make sense rather than 
nonsense of the law.” 
Scalia and Garner are less full-throated in their dismissal of hypothetical intentionalism in 
the treatise, but it is a dismissal nonetheless.  They cite the recommendation of Tony Honoré that 
the interpreter “treat the text as if it represented the view of a single individual, and make it as 
coherent as the words permit.”88  Scalia and Garner concede that such an approach would make 
legislative intent a “cogent fiction,” but they reject it as not what searchers for legislative intent 
mean by that phrase (curious that the immediately preceding quotation of Honoré didn’t throw 
cold water on that claim).  They suggest that Honoré instead adopt the term “statutory intent”:  
“Although even this term invites a search for some subjective intent, it accords more precisely 
with what Professor Honoré believes.”89  Bewilderingly, they then change the subject without 
having responded substantively to Honoré’s proposal. 
Well I think Honoré’s proposal a good one.  It seems to me that the hypothetical 
intentionalism approach sidesteps all three of the objections to reliance on legislative intent with 
which we began.  Hypothetical intent is not metaphysically dubious like the kind of actual 
                                                             
88 Scalia and Garner, 393-94 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
89 Ibid., 394. 
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legislative intent Scalia and Garner deny exists; it does not rely for its being on having been 
present in the psychologies of every legislator who voted to pass the bill and of the executive 
who signed it into law.  Rather, the interpreter imputes it to those legislators.  By the same 
maneuver, the epistemological objection is evaded.  The interpreter does not have to go and 
discover some intent that is “out there”; again, we impute it.  Finally, doing so does not require 
that we consult any forbidden sources of legislative intent, like legislative history.  The intent 
that guides us appears in the law itself—in that we attribute a certain intent to the legislative 
author as we read the text—just as the “purpose” or “context” Scalia and Garner sporadically 
invoke is textually manifest. 
One difficulty remains, however, and it is one that motivated textualism in the first 
place.  It is the problem of judicial discretion, or latitude in interpretation.  Yes, hypothetical 
intentionalism can get us meaningful content in the form of conventional meaning supplemented 
by attributed authorial intent.  But can it get us definitive content, a right answer to interpretive 
questions?  I do not think it holds that promise.  But neither does textualism, as Scalia and 
Garner admit.90 
The textualist-cum-hypothetical-intentionalist thus faces a dilemma.  Either accept that 
there will be some latitude in judicial interpretations of statutes, or find a way to nail down the 
intent component so that it makes a definitive selection from among the interpretations of which 
                                                             
90 “[J]udges who use the fair-reading method will arrive at fairly consistent answers.  We do not mean to 
say the decisions will be easy.  Nothing is easy.  But the relevant line of inquiry is pretty straightforward.”  Ibid., 36 
(first emphasis added).  It is worth noting that this “pretty straightforward” characterization comes in the lead-up to 
the tortuous “no vehicles in the park” analysis. 
 
See also Judge Frank Easterbrook’s remarks in the Foreword:  “The textualist method of interpretation 
cannot produce judicial unanimity across the board, however. . . .  Imagine a Supreme Court comprising Justice 
Scalia and eight near clones.  That Court would find lots of cases to be hard . . . .  It would grant review of those 
hard cases and decide many of them five to four . . . .”  Ibid., xxiv-xxv. 
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the conventional meaning admits.91  Some options for nailing down the intent component are 
ruled out on account of the by-now familiar political objection.  Legislative history, for 
instance.  Perhaps taking judicial notice of the historical context, or the state of affairs 
surrounding enactment, would be more palatable.  That certainly goes on in Scalia’s 
interpretations of older legislation such as the Constitution, although Scalia swears such research 
merely serves a dictionary function—but as mentioned at the start, such issues surrounding 
originalism are outside the scope of this paper.  Neither do I want to rule out categorically the 
possibility of identifying the genuine collective intent of the legislature, although settling the 
criteria for such collective intent would involve considerable further research into the 
metaphysics of shared agency, also beyond our present scope.  In the ensuing, final part, I will 
proceed on the assumption that such genuine collective intent cannot be identified.  How might 
the hypothetical intentionalist restrict judicial discretion in legislative interpretation? 
  
                                                             
91 I believe that Scalia and Garner are right in their contention that a given piece of language can bear only 
a range of “permissible meanings.”  Ibid., 31-33.  Where I disagree is that their methodological apparatus provides a 
principle of selection for choosing the correct permissible meaning.  Ultimately the “reasonable reader” and the “fair 
reading” fail to explain; they just restate the problem at one remove. 
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VI.   THE REAL DEBATE OVER LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION 
 
 
One advantage of collapsing the false intent-purpose distinction is that we see that 
ground-level meaning is suffused with intent.  Scalia and Garner talk as if purpose often appears 
at the ground level along with conventional meaning, while intent exists on some higher plane 
that need not and should not be accessed when interpreting legislation.  I have tried to show that 
is not the case.  If, as I contend, all of the constituents of meaning reside on a single plane, then 
the real debate over legislative interpretation becomes, how wide do we set the interpretive 
parameters?  Put another way, if we adopt my proposed interpretation-guiding question—“What 
did the legislature intend here?”—how wide a berth do we give that crucial “here”? 
By way of demonstration, once more unto the park.  We saw that Scalia and Garner 
imputed a legislative intent to keep out of the park the kinds of things that make for traffic.  They 
then bite back against that imputed intent with their application of the ordinary-meaning canon, 
to prove they are no purposivists:  “The purposivist approach assumes that legal instruments 
make complete sense.  Of course they should be so interpreted where the language permits—but 
not where it does not.”  Pure applesauce.  The word “vehicle” obviously permits an interpretation 
that includes airplanes, especially once Scalia and Garner impute the intent they so clearly do. 
Now, a real interpretive question would arise if the case at bar involved an ambulance or 
other emergency vehicle having entered the park.  Scalia and Garner imagine a purposivist judge 
reading the statute to exclude only noisy vehicles based on speculation that the purpose was to 
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preserve peace and repose:  “The purposivist would probably make an exception to the noisy-
vehicle ban for ambulances:  What lawmaker could possibly place the objective of peace and 
quiet above the objective of saving a human life?  What the purposivist comes up with is not (as 
our solution is) a selection from among the permissible meanings of vehicle.  None of those 
meanings includes only noisy vehicles (except ambulances) . . . .”92  Just one paragraph on, 
however, Scalia and Garner grant that “it may well be that the undeniable exclusion of 
ambulances by the text of the ordinance is countermanded by an ordinance or court-made rule 
exempting emergency vehicles from traffic rules.”93  As to any possible meaningful difference 
between making a judicial exception to the broad statutory ban on vehicles in the present case 
versus relying on a judicial exception for emergency vehicles made in an earlier case (such that 
the former should be condemned and the latter condoned), the reader’s guess is as good as 
mine.  But for present purposes, the point of interest is that “no vehicles in the park” might be 
interpreted (a) in isolation, as Scalia and Garner do initially, (b) in light of other legislation, (c) in 
light of interpretations courts of the jurisdiction have given to related statutes in the past, or (d) in 
light of (b) and (c). 
Scalia and Garner criticize their more jurisprudentially liberal counterparts for their 
propensity to “climb the ladder of abstraction” in order to reach the statutory purpose needed to 
justify their preferred reading.  In my view, it makes more sense to frame the question in terms of 
how many legal sources we may consult:  with each additional source, more information bearing 
on legislative intent comes in.  As I remarked earlier, there are no “concrete” purposes.  And 
when it comes to language, we are all of us purposivists, so we always find ourselves somewhere 
                                                             
92 Scalia and Garner, 39. 
 
93 Ibid. 
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on the ladder of abstraction.  Perhaps keeping the interpretive parameters narrow will keep 
judges rooted to a lower rung, if that is what we want. 
Typically that is what textualists want, so they home in on the single sentence or very few 
sentences at issue in a dispute (though certainly not always).  Scalia and Garner criticize United 
Steelworkers v. Weber,94 for instance, for “permit[ting] a racially-based affirmative action 
program in the face of a statute that made it unlawful to ‘discriminate . . . because of . . . 
race.’”95  What Scalia and Garner omit is that another provision of the statute provided, “Nothing 
contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential 
treatment to any individual . . . because of the race . . . of such individual . . . .”96  If that 
provision is within the parameters of interpretation too, then Scalia and Garner’s own negative-
implication canon would seem to indicate the Court’s holding was correct:  if nothing in the law 
requires affirmative action, the implicated intent is that neither does anything in the law 
prohibit affirmative action.  Justice Rehnquist, whom we might classify an actual (as opposed to 
hypothetical) intentionalist, dissented citing legislative history reflecting that the second 
provision was added to assuage concerns that the law as it stood would require preferential 
treatment of minorities—the possibility of voluntary affirmative action was not one that had 
occurred to the members of Congress. 
Scalia and Garner would have decided Weber by determining the meaning of (a) the most 
relevant operative provision, in isolation.  Another option, illustrated by the opinion of the Court, 
is to include also in the assessment (b) a second relevant provision of the same statute and (c) the 
                                                             
94 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 
95 Scalia and Garner, 12 (quoting § 703(a) and (d) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
 
96 § 703(j), Title VII, 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
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apparent intent (or canon of construction) of exclusion by negative implication.  Justice 
Rehnquist took a third tack and looked also to (d) the legislative history of the statute.  We can 
imagine still wider parameters that would let in (e) other federal anti-discrimination statutes or 
regulations, (f) any other federal employment statutes or regulations, (g) the statutory (as distinct 
from legislative) history, (h) prior judicial interpretations of similar statutory language, (i) 
relevant constitutional provisions, and (j) canons of construction that call for interpretation on the 
presumption that Congress intended to legislate constitutionally.  No doubt there are others. 
I think this is the other aspect, in addition to the shifting role of purpose and the cross-
cutting canons, that gives Scalia and Garner’s treatise its ad hoc feel.  Sometimes “context,” 
which is always relevant in interpretation, is a byword for purpose.  Other times it means strictly 
the immediate syntactic setting of a word or phrase.  Elsewhere it means the whole text of the 
statute, any related statutes and their prior judicial constructions, the settled expectations of the 
bar, the common-law elements of a codified crime (sometimes including the mens rea element), 
any relevant policy presumptions as embodied in the canons, and even the entire corpus juris.97 
It makes sense to hypothesize that there is generally a direct proportional relationship 
between the latitude a judge has in determining the meaning of a legislative provision and the 
number of legal sources permitted to supplement the conventional meaning of that provision.  As 
I have argued, even reading the provision in isolation is going to involve some attribution of 
intent.  Each of Scalia and Garner’s canons, and the additional sources they bring in tow, 
augment the role of that hypothetical-intent attribution, and correspondingly diminish the role of 
the conventional meaning of the operative provision.  And the greater the profile of the intent 
                                                             
97 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “Three Symmetries between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory 
Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment within Both,” Cornell Law Review 99, no. 4 
(2014): 685-734, discussing various elements providing context to textualist interpretations. 
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attribution, the more discretion the judge enjoys.  A thoroughgoing textualist, then, should be 
more motivated to restrict the parameters of interpretation than are Scalia and Garner.  At all 
events, once we recognize that there is no categorical difference between textualism and 
purposivism—because there is no way of excising speaker intent from linguistic meaning—we 
can move on to debating this central question of legislative interpretation and to the task of 
finding a principled methodology for setting those parameters of interpretation. 
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